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Bioethics and the Family: 
The Cautionary View from Family Law· 
Carl E. Schneider•• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many years, the field of bioethics has been specially 
concerned with how the authority to make medical decisions 
should be allocated between doctor and patient. Today the 
patient's power-indeed, the patient's right-is widely acknowl-
edged, at least in principle. But this development can hardly be 
the last word in our thinking about how medical decisions should 
be made. For one thing, sometimes patients cannot speak for 
themselves. For another, patients· make medical decisions in 
contexts that significantly include more participants thanjust the 
patient and doctor. Now, as this conference demonstrates, 
bioethics is beginning to ask what role the patient's family should 
play in making medical decisions. 
In addition, bioethics has in recent years increasingly been 
required to address another kind of problem: How should we 
resolve the ethical dilemmas associated with matters of reproduc-
tion-particularly novel means of reproduction, like in vitro 
fertilization and surrogate motherhood? As the technical capacities 
of medicine have expanded, these bioethical questions have raised 
* © Copyright 1992, Carl E. Schneider. 
** Professor ofLaw, University of Michigan. This Article is a somewhat altered ver-
sion of a paper presented at the University of Utah College of Law and Utah Law Reuiew 
Symposium on Ethics, Bioethics, and Family Law. An earlier incarnation of that paper 
was presented at a conference at the Hastings Center on the Family and Bioethics. I am 
grateful to the conferees at both the University and the Hastings Center for their helpful 
comments and to both institutions for providing an atmosphere so admirably conducive 
to the rational discussion of controversial questions. Finally, I am glad to thank my 
colleague Patricia D. White for her insightful responses to an earlier draft of this 
manuscript. 
For the reasons described in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chi 
L Rev 1343 (1986), I will adhere to The Uniuersity of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation 
(Lawyers Co-Op, 1989). As a great man once said, "Faites simple." I am enthusiastically 
grateful to the editors of the Utah Law Reuiew for the uncommonly generous way in 
which they have accommodated my wish to strike a blow for freedom from the 
formalisms and fatuities-no, the inanities and insanities-of The Bluebook. 
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pressing and puzzling issues about what a family is and how it 
should and should not be created. 
In short, bioethics today confronts ultimate and essential 
questions about the ethical and social bases of family life. My task 
here is to ask what bioethics might learn about these troubling 
questions from the experience of another field which has wrestled 
with them for centuries-family law. I have a second task as well. 
This is, after all, a symposium on family law, and I hope that I 
might make myself useful to that field by providing in brief form 
and with concrete illustrations a taxonomy and survey of some of 
family law's basic conceptual approaches. 
Family law ought to have something to say to bioethics about 
these problems. To begin with, many bioethical issues directly 
concern family law. For instance, family law seeks to regulate the 
situation in which children are created and given families. Many 
other bioethical issues deal with matters-like decisions about 
medical care-that impinge on family life and that family law has 
thus been interested in. More generally, family law has long 
experience with a multitude of ethical problems involving the 
relations between and the regulation of family members. Family 
law therefore should have developed vocabularies and approaches 
that could illuminate bioethical problems. 
At the very least, we might expect family law to offer 
bioethics some concept of the family. Family law ought to have 
developed some definition of "family,'• since it needs to know what 
it is about a grouping of people that makes a grouping a family. 
It ought also to have reached some understanding about what the 
moral and social relationships of family members are, so that it 
can know what claims they may make on each other and what 
duties they owe each other. Such a conception of the family is 
surely crucial to both major branches of bioethics, since they deal 
precisely with the creation of families and often with the responsi-
bilities of faniily members. 
My paper will be divided into several sections, each devoted 
to a particular conceptual approach to the problems of family law. 
Each section will describe the approach, briefly evaluate its 
current status in family law, and then ask what usefulness the 
approach might have for bioethical problems. ffitimately I will 
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argue that family law offers no vocabulary or approach that can 
directly and readily be adopted in analyzing bioethical issues. This 
conclusion should not be surprising. Family law is law operating 
at its outer limits, trying to govern the most ungovernable of 
human relationships, seeking to understand the most mysterious 
and controversial aspects of sociallife.1 
Yet all this does not mean that bioethics can learn nothing by 
looking at family law. On the contrary, there is much to be gained 
by looking at the reasons for family law's conceptual limits and 
practical constraints; for those reasons reveal something about the 
claims, conflicts, and contradictions that make bioethical questions 
so painful and contemporary family law so problematic. 
IT. MORAL DISCOURSE 
By definition, bioethical problems raise moral issues. What 
kind of discourse about moral issues does family law use and how 
might that discourse be recruited to deal witb. bioethical issues? 
Until recently, we might plausibly have tried to answer that 
question, since over the preceding century family law had 
developed a tolerably clear definition of the family and a reason-
ably coherent body of beliefs about the relations among family 
members and the purposes of family life. That definition and those 
beliefs had a fairly well understood moral basis, they were 
articulated in moral terms, and they required courts to analyze 
many individual cases at least partly in moral language. In the 
last two or three decades, however, family law has increasingly 
eschewed moral discourse. That is, there has been (with some 
exceptions) growing reluctance to have the law serve expressly 
moral goals, to articulate legal principles in moral terms, and to 
have courts analyze problems in moral language. Simultaneously, 
many moral decisions have been transferred from the law to the 
1. For an investigation of these features of family law, see Carl E. Schneider, The 
Next Step: Definitwn, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 U Mich 
J L Ref 1039 (1985). 
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people the law once sought to regulate.2 No-fault divorce exempli-
fies this trend: 
[B]efore no-fault divorce, a court discussed a petition for 
divorce in moral terms; after no-fault divorce, such a petition 
_did not have to be discussed in moral terms. Before no-fault 
divorce, the law stated a view of the moral prerequisites to 
divorce; after no-fault diyorce, the law is best seen as stating 
no view on the subject. Before no-fault divorce, the law 
retained for itself much of the responsibility for the moral 
choice whether to divorce; after no-fault, most of that responsi-
bility was transferred to the husband and wife.3 
The waning of moral discourse in family law has a number 
of causes, including the doctrine of family autonomy,4 the tradi-
tion of liberal individualism, a series of modern upheavals in 
moral beliefs, the constitutionalization of family law, and the 
medicalization-especially the "psychologization"-of social issues. 
But several of the trend's most central causes can be summarized 
by the phrase "the standards problem." An important justification 
for the doctrine of family autonomy has long been that people 
disagree about how families ought to be organized and run and 
that those disagreements often reduce to unresolvable disputes 
over unverifiable l?eliefs. Americans have grown increasingly 
sensitive to cultural and individual variations in views on these 
subjects and have increasingly felt that society should not impose 
its standards on people, particularly where those standards affect 
people's intimate relations. For all these reasons, it is increasingly 
felt that standards for governing family relations cannot and 
should not be written. 
2. For a full statement of this hypothesis, see Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse 
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich L Rev 1803 (1985). In that 
Article, as here, I argue only that the developments I describe are a trend, not a fully 
accomplished fact. For a (partial) normative evaluation of the trend, see Carl E. 
Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L Rev 
197, 233-57. For characteristically thoughtful comments on the trend, see Lee E. 
Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 Mich L Rev 430 (1985). 
3. Schneider, 83 Mich L Rev at 1810 (cited in note 2). 
4. This is the standard principle offamily law that the state ought wherever possible 
to refrain from "intervening'' in the family. For a discussion of what "intervention" might 
mean, see Schneider, 1991 BYU L REV at 235-43 (cited in note 2). 
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What consequences do the diminution in moral discourse and 
the standards problem which partly underlies it have for family 
law's usefulness to bioethics? One consequence has been that a 
plausible (if not always optimal) means of resolving such ques-
tions-directly addressing the moral issue presented by the 
bioethical issue-is made less attractive or is even foreclosed. Roe 
v. Wade exemplifies this point in two ways. First, Roe's holding 
largely removed from the law's purview the issue qf the morality 
of abortion in general and of any individual's abortion in particu-
lar. Second, the opinion's reasoning expressly sought to reach a 
conclusion without discussing the morality of abortion. Less 
dramatically, the diminution in moral discourse and the standards 
problem have meant that family law's cupboard is increasingly 
bare of moral concepts of the family that might inform discussions 
of such bioethical dilemmas as surrogate-mother agreements and 
of the role families should play in making medical decisions for · 
their incompetent members.5 There is in fact some evidence that 
courts directly confronting bioethical problems have sought to do 
so without embarking on moral inquiries. AB Allen Buchanan 
notes, for instance, 11From Quinlan on, the courts have attempted 
to avoid the fundamental philosophical and constitutional .issues 
raised by the task of developing a more adequate concept of the 
person and hence of the death of a person.116 
For us, however, the most momentQus consequence of the 
trend away from moral discourse in the law and of the unremit-
ting prominence of the standards problem has been that the law 
is more and more driven to find ways around the standards 
problem. That is, the law has increasingly had to ask, if we cannot 
directly address the moral aspects of the issues we face, what 
other ways can we find of analyzing and resolving them? The rest 
of this paper will examine some of the leading alternatives. 
5. It is worth observing that there are institutional differences in the willingness to 
engage in moral discourse. Such discourse is likeliest to occur in legislatures, partly 
because the need to write statutes and pressure from constituents and interest groups 
often bring moral issues to the fore. 
6. Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision-Making, in Rolf Sartorius, ed, 
Paternalism 153 (U Minn Press, 1983). 
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III. THE PROTECTIVE FuNCTION 
One way out of the dilemmas caused by the diminution of 
moral discourse and by the standards problem has been to justify 
governmental action in terms of one of family law's least contro-
versial enterprises-the protective function. That function 
effectuates the law's duty to protect citizens against the various 
harms that might befall them, and particularly to protect them 
from injuries done them by other citizens.7 Moral discourse in 
family law is presently strongest and the standards problem is 
presently weakest in those areas where it can be said that the law 
is protecting someone who cannot protect himself, who is helpless 
against a more powerful person. Thus some of the topics in family 
law most often discussed today in moral terms are spouse abuse, 
child abuse, and child support. In other words, the protective 
function can sometimes seem uncontroversial enough or pressing 
enough to escape some of the strictures of the standards problem. 
family law's protective function might seem to offer useful 
approaches at least to some bioethical problems. Thus it is 
sometimes said that surrogate-mother contracts ought to be 
prohibited in the interest of protecting surrogates from the pains 
of having to give up a child who is (often) genetically theirs and 
(always) gestationally theirs. And thus it is sometimes suggested 
that the ability of parents to refuse medical treatment for their 
defective newborn infants ought to be supervised and superseded 
in order to protect those infants. 
But the protective function is subject to (at least) four generic 
problems which, in bioethics as in family law, will often prove 
disabling. The first is that protection easily degenerates into 
paternalism: It will often seem improper to protect people who do 
not want protection or who even actively resist it. It was this fear, 
for example, that in important part motivated Justice Brennan's 
dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.8 He 
7. For an extended treatment of the protective function, see Carl E. Schneider, 
Family Law: Cases and Materials (West, forthcoming 1993). 
8. 58 USLW 4916 (1990). Nancy Cruzan was a young woman who had fallen into a 
persistent vegetative state after an automobile accident. Her parents sought to have the 
hospital in which she lay discontinue her food and water. A Missouri statute, however, 
required anyone asking that food and water be withheld from a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state show by clear and convincing evidence that that withdrawal was what 
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argued that the state was protecting Nancy C:ruzan's life, but that 
she found that life a burden, wished to end it, and was entitled to 
do so.9 Similarly, a blanket prohibition of surrogate-mother 
contracts could be justified as protecting women from the misery 
of losing children they had borne and wished to keep. But such a 
prohibition would be regarded by many prospective surrogates as 
an undue interference with their liberty and an inaccurate 
reflection on their ability to make decisions for themselves. 
A second generic problem of the protective function is that it 
will not always be clear what 11protection11 in a given case means. 
Was Nancy Cruzan being protected by the state; which wished to 
preserve her life, or by her parents, who wished to save her from 
what her life had become? Would statutes prohibiting abortion 
protect the lives of unborn children? Or does Roe v. Wade protect 
pregnant women from the dangers of abortion statutes? As these 
questions are intended to suggest, attempts to serve the protective 
function can return us to the standards problem and to its 
underlying issues about what makes life good, matters as to which 
answers are obscure and agreement is elusive. 
The protective function's third characteristic problem-is that, 
in trying to protect people from one harm, the state-because it is 
large, complex, cumbersome, and obliged to follow rules that must 
often be broadly phrased and inflexibly interpreted-will some-
times, perhaps frequently, injure people in unanticipated ways. 
Worse, the injured people can easily be those the law is most 
anxious to help. For instance, we might want to judicialize medical 
decisions in order to protect patients from improvident decisions 
to terminate treatment. But the classic defect of such judicializat-
ion is that it imposes painful burdens in time, trouble, expense, 
and misery on doctors, nurses, families, and, what is worst, on the 
patients themselves. 
The fourth generic problem with the protective function is 
that sometimes the law cannot safeguard all the people who may 
seem to need help because their interests conflict. In a surrogate-
mother case, do you protect the surrogate, whose deep attachment 
the patient would have wanted. The Missouri courts held that Cruzan)s parents had not 
made such a showing. The United States Supreme Court held that nothing in the United 
States Constitution prevented Missouri from imposing such a requirement. I discuss 
Cruzan and the rights thinking that undergirds it in some detail in Part VI. 
9. ld at 4926-34 (Brennan dissenting). 
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to her child is threatened? Do you protect th~ contracting parent, 
for whom surrogacy may be the only way of having a biologically 
related child and who has nurtured months of expectations and 
hopes? Do you protect the infant, the one person in the story who 
cannot speak for himself? 
In sum, the flaw of the protective function as a path of escape 
from the standards problems is that it works best in the easy 
cases. In poorly explored and daunting areas like the bioethical 
conflicts we are discussing, resorting to the protective function as 
justification is likely only to force us back to those moral questions 
we had hoped to escape. 
IV. OFFICIAL DISCRETION 
When the law finds itself unable to write standards, it often 
transfers decisions to the discretion of an official or a judge. T;hls 
is an old technique in the law generally, and for excellent reasons. 
Courts and bureaucracies often need flexibility to adjust their 
decisions to the world's complexity. Judges and administrators are 
frequently accorded discretion because would-be rule makers 
realize that they cannot anticipate all the circumstances in which 
they might wish a rule to be applied, because they hope that 
judges will be well-situated to construct rules by accretion as they 
gain experience deciding cases in an area, and simply because rule 
makers find they Cannot agree on a rule.10 
At:cording judges discretion is, of course, a recurring family-
law technique for avoiding direct confrontations with the stan-
dards problem. A particularly vivid example of the technique in 
that field is the law of child custody, which uses the markedly 
discretionary criterion of the child's 11best interest.11 It is a tech-
nique which has found fresh favor in the law governing the 
allocation of a couple's property on divorce, in which courts may 
now be directed to divide the spouses' property 11equitably.11 
Despite the regularity with which family law has substituted 
discretion for standards, the technique is not in good odor in the 
field. Virtually every major. figure in the field has condemned 
10. For a more extensive survey of the merits and demerits of rules and discretion, 
see Carl E. Schneider, Rules and Discretion: A Lawyer's View, in Keith Hawkins, ed, The 
Uses of Discretion (Oxford U Press, forthcoming 1993). 
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child-custody law's best-interest standard as deplorably indetermi-
nate.11 Equitable distribution simpliciter is not well-established 
and is currently under attack. Federal law now calls for mechani-
cal guidelines to replace discretionary awards of child support. And 
there is notable sentiment in favor of substituting elaborately 
specific criteria for intervention in families in child-abuse-and-
neglect cases for the old and discretionary intervene-whenever-it's-
necessary standard. 
The reasons official discretion is unloved in family law largely 
apply to bioethics. These reasons are too familiar to bear prolonged 
reiteration here, since they are the standard objections to discre-
tion. They include the arguments that discretion allows officials 
and judges to let their prejudices affect their decisions, that 
discretion leads to inconsistent decisions, and that discretionary 
standards give affected parties insufficient guidance about what 
the law expects of them or will do to them. Further, granting 
officials and judges discretion solves the standards problem only 
in the sense of relieving a legislature of the tasks of formulating, 
articulating, and getting the votes to enact standards. After all, an 
official or judge must base a decision on some kind of principle, 
even if it is unarticulated or even unconscious. Discretion does not 
eliminate the question whether the principle chosen is a good one 
and whether it is right to hold people to it rather than allowing 
them to choose for themselves how to behave. These kinds of 
problems with discretion may be made more concrete by imagining 
what the Court's reaction to confiding a decision in Cruzan to the 
unfettered discretion of a judge or official would have been. Many 
of the Justices, at least, would have protested that such a rule 
grievously violates a patient's rights to decide what care to receive 
and to enjoy the benefits of due process.12 Thus, while awarding 
11. For two first-rate examples of those criticisms, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, L & Contemp 
Probs 226 (Summer 1975); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for 
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich L Rev 477 (1984). For a critical review of those 
criticisms and ·a cautious and constrained defense of discretion, see Carl E. Schneider, 
Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 
Mich L Rev 2215 (1991). 
12. There are, however, many forms of official discretion, and it is often extremely 
difficult to formulate rules for resolving complex problems without confiding a good deal 
of discretion in some official. The opinions in Cruzan generally seem to contemplate that, 
at least in many instances, a court would have to decide whether an incompetent patient 
would have wanted treatment terminated. Given the probable quality of evidence in 
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grants of discretion may in fact be a good way of handling many 
bioethical problems, family law is at best uneasy authority for that 
conclusion. 
V. FAMILY AUTHORITY 
If the state cannot promulgate standards, and if it cannot 
finesse the problem away by giving officials or judges discretion, 
it must transfer decisions to someone else. As I said earlier in my 
discussion of moral discourse, this is exactly what family law has 
tried to do. Even before the "transformation" of family law, 
numerous decisions were assigned to "the family." Thus courts 
have long refused to resolve many kinds of disputes between 
family members on the grounds that families ought to be encour-
aged to work out their own problems in their own way. And thus 
states have long confided responsibility for most decisions about 
children to their parents. 
The application of this view to a number of bioethical issues 
is obvious and appealing. Some of the bioethical decisions associat-
ed with reproduction already have been or might plausibly be 
resolved by referring them to the family. Thus decisions about the 
morality of an abortion have been transferred to the pregnant 
woman, in part with the expectation (but not compulsion) that she 
will share that decision with the father. Decisions about medical 
care for incompetents are, at least in practice, often made by the 
patient's family, 13 and many people believe, as the dissents in 
Cruzan indicate, that this is right and proper.14 Nevertheless, 
family law's experience suggests some difficulties with solving the 
standards problem by deferring to "the family." 
many of these cases, this is a decision which it will often be impossible to make without 
a considerable exercise of discretion. 
13. See, for example, Stewart B. Levine, et al, Informed Consent in the Electroconuul-
siue Treatment of Geriatric Patients, 19 Bul Am Acad Psych L 395 (1991); Clara C. Pratt, 
et al,Autonomy and Decision Making Between Single Older Women and Their Caregiuing 
Daughters, 29 Gerontologist 792 (1989). In practical fact, of course, the family's power 
is, at best, shared with physicians. For an illuminating investigation of the relationship 
between doctors and families in medical decisions, see Robert Zussman, lntensiue Care: 
Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession (U Chi Press, 1992). 
14. For an influential statement of this position, see Nancy K Rhoden, Litigating 
Life and Death, 102 Harv L Rev 375 (1988). 
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Perhaps the most basic of these difficulties is that the 
conceptual basis for this deference has been eroded in recent 
years. Traditionally, as I suggested a moment ago, the law 
assumed that family members are united by bonds of mutual 
concern so strong that the law could and should treat each family 
as a whole and not just as a collection of individual family 
members.15 Thus the law was willing to have family members 
make decisions for each other and even (as I suggested above) to 
insist that decisions be made within families rather than by 
courts. 
Increasingly, however, courts and commentators have 
attacked this view of the family. To some critics, deferring to "the 
family" really means confirming the power of its most powerful 
member.16 To some of these critics, such deference simply affirms 
the patriarchal principle. To others, it denies the rights and 
personhood of children. To still others, it threatens the autonomy 
and self-sufficiency of all members of the family. Yet other critics 
find the entity view simply mistaken, on the reasoning that 
families are irreducibly made up of individuals and have no 
interests other than those of their members. Finally, critics who 
are concerned about the standards problem find the entity view 
objectionable because it embodies and promotes a normative 
ideal-however vague-of the family. 
Family law has thus more and more come to regard family 
members as individuals who no doubt have important relation-
ships with each other but who should be treated as legally 
distinct. As Justice Brennan wrote in a telling and influential 
passage, "[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with 
a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals 
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.'117 
Professor Hafen describes the new view of the family as contractu-
al. He suggests that families are increasingly united by a merely 
contractual solidarity, one whose "main motivation is 'purposive, 
15. For a thoughtful statement of this view, see Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an 
Entity, 22 UC Davis L Rev 865 (1989). 
16. See, for example, Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis 
L Rev 1135; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U Mich 
J L Ref 835 (1985). For comments on this view, see Schneider, BYU L Rev at 235-43 
(cited in note 2). 
17. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438, 453 (1972). 
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implicitly egoistic, utilitarian,' and lacking in a 'sense of sociocul-
tural oneness of the parties.' Each party typically enters the 
relationship 'for his own sake, uniting with the other party only so 
far as this provides him with an advantage (profit, pleasure, or 
service)."'18 
The law now recognizes the individuality of family members 
in a variety of ways. For example, no-fault divorce, by making 
divorce available on demand, forswears any legal effort to hamper 
each spouse's ability to leave the family. Family law has increas-
ingly allowed spouses (and unmarried cohabitants) to contract 
with each other. The ever-more-common practice of appointing 
lawyers to represent children in cases-like custody or medical-
care proceedings-in which their parents are litigants further 
recognizes the legal separateness of family members and the 
possible (or even presumptive?) adversity of their interests.19 This 
pattern similarly presents itself in cases raising bioethical issues. 
Bellotti v. Baird!-0 makes one important kind of decision-wheth-
er a child should have an abortion-essentially a decision for the 
child alone, and not one for the family.21 Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth22 makes the wife's decision whether 
to have an abortion one she may make without obtaining her 
husband's consent.23 
We have looked at the way family law has tried to escape the 
standards problem by referring decisions to the family. But, I have 
been arguing, the standards problem itself (at least in some of its 
more sweeping versions) undercuts the basis for any such referral. 
18. Hafen, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 895-96 (cited in note 15.) 
19. See, for example, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989), where a wife 
allegedly bore the child of a man other than her husband. Id at 113-14. The child's 
putative natural father sued to be declared the legal father. Id at 118. When the child 
was a little less than two years old, the court appointed a lawyer to represent her. Id at 
114. When the Supreme Court decided the case the child was slightly over eight years 
old, and she was still represented by counsel. Id at 130-32. For an examination of the 
case in light of the state's interest in the family as an entity, see Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 Hofstra L Rev 495 (forthcoming 1992). For 
investigations of the problems posed when lawyers represent clients who cannot speak 
for themselves, see Robert H. Mnookin, et al, In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law 
Reform, and Public Policy (WH Freeman & Co, 1985); and Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers 
and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich L Rev 919 (1986). 
20. 443 us 622 (1979). 
21. Id at 643-44. 
22. 428 us 52 (1976). 
23. Id at 69. 
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The referral is best justified by a moral view of the family that 
makes it an appropriate decision maker. The law once accepted 
such a view. Now, partly because of the standards problem, it is 
disinclined to do so. Thus the rationale for deferring to the family 
is markedly weakened.24 
The problem with referring bioethical decisions to the family 
is not just that the basis for such a referral has been eroded. It is 
also that, unless "family" is quite broadly defined, some number 
of people will have no family to which a decision can be referred 
(and even if it is broadly defined, some people will still not have 
a family able and willing to take on the burden of their bioethical 
decisions). For example, within the ordinary understanding of the 
law, a single adult like Nancy Cruzan25 has been emancipated 
from her family, so that her parents can no longer make decisions 
for her. But why not simply define Nancy Cruzan's family to. 
include her parents? In her case, and in many cases, that is no 
doubt the right thing to do. But whatever the wisdom of defining 
"family" broadly in particular cases, family law may hesitate to do 
so when writing generally applicable rules. Let us ask why. 
The family to which decisions are ordinarily referred is 
essentially the nuclear family.26 Within it are two kinds of 
relationships. There are special reasons to expect people in each 
of these relationships to make good decisions for each other. The 
first relationship is marital. Husbands and wives should make 
good decisions for each other because they have confided special 
love and trust in each other. The second relationship is parental. 
Parents should make good decisions for their children because of 
the perhaps-instinctual feelings oflove, concern, and responsibility 
parents have for their young children. The quality of both kinds of 
decisions should be enhanced where families live in households: 
People who are committed to living intimately together for ma,ny 
24. I use "weakened" advisedly. The entity view of the family retains many 
adherents even in the remotenesses of academe. See, for example, Hafen, 22 UC Davis 
L Rev (cited in note 15). It is probably the conventional wisdom among much of the rest 
of the country. See Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment 
"Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, L & Contemp 
Probs 79, 107-110 (Winter 1988). And even people who reject it will still often find 
reasons in particular cases to prefer familial to governmental decisions. 
25. It appears that her marriage ended sometime after her accident. Cruzan, 58 
USLW at 4917. 
26. See, for example, Michael H., 491 US at 117-30. 
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years should act wisely for each other because they come to know 
each other deeply and because their interests become so richly 
intertwined. 27 
Of course, parents are still, today as yesterday, bound by ties 
of blood, love, and experience to their adult children. But more and 
more, American society expects parents to raise their children to 
develop. their own values, to leave their parents' homes, to 
establish their own householCls, to lead their own lives. 11Therefore 
shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto 
his wife: and they shall be one flesh.1128 Partly in pursuit of that 
goal, family law has increasingly promoted the autonomy of minor 
children. A fortiori, will it not promote the autonomy of adult 
children?29 If the idea that parents of an adult child should not 
be legally· considered part of the child's family seems plainly 
wrong, consider the cases we now sometimes see in which parents 
of an incompetent adult contend with his homosexual lover for the 
power to make decisions for him. 
I have been discussing the problems with broadening the 
definition of family in its easiest form-to include parents of adult 
27. This argument, however, should not be pushed too far. There is evidence that 
many people do not discuss their preferences about medical care with their families. See, 
for example, Dallas M. High, All in the Family: Extended Autonomy and Expectations in 
Surrogate Health Care Decision-Making, 28 Gerontologist 46 (Supp 1988); Bernard Lo, 
et al, Patient Attitudes to Discussing Life-Sustaining Treatment, 146 Archives Internal 
Med 1613 (1986). Worse, there is some direct reason to doubt that families in fact 
accurately learn their members' preferences about medical care from living with them. 
See, for example, Tom Tomlinson, et al, An Empirical Study of Proxy Consent for Elderly 
Persons, 30 Gerontologist 54 (1990); Joseph G. Ouslander, et al, Health Care Decisions 
Among Elderly Long-Term Care Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 Archives 
Internal Med 1367 (1989); Allison B. Seckler, et al, Substituted Judgment: How Accurate 
Are Proxy Predictions?, 115 Annals Internal Med 92 (1991); Richard F. Uhlmann, et al, 
Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J 
Gerontology M115 (1988). 
Despite all this, there is also evidence that people generally prefer that their 
families participate in making medical decisions while they are competent and make 
medical decisions for them when they cannot do so themselves. See, for example, 
Madelyn A. Iris, Guardianship and the Elderly: A Multi-Perspective View of the 
Decisionmaking Process, 28 Gerontologist 39 (Supp 1988); Dallas M. High and Howard 
B. Turner, Surrogate Decision-Making: The Elderly's Familial Expectations, 8 Theoretical 
Med 303 (1987). 
28. Genesis 2:24. See Leslie Francis, The Roles of the Family in Making Health Care 
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 1992 Utah L Rev 861. 
29. For insightful reflections on the autonomy and responsibility of adult children, 
see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Intergenerational Responsibility and Family Obligation: On 
Sharing, 1992 Utah L Rev 765; Hilde L. Nelson and James L. Nelson, Frail Parents, 
Robust Duties, 1992 Utah L Rev 747. 
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children. All these problems worsen when we consider broadening 
the definition to include people unrelated by blood. What may we 
infer from family law's experience with this problem? The law has 
become more willing to treat as a "family" a group of people whose 
relationship performs the functions that a traditional family 
performs. Thus Marvin v. Marvin80 offers protections to people 
leaving non-marital cohabitation that resemble those offered to 
people ending marriages.31 And thus Braschi v. Stahl Associ-
ates82 treats a homosexual couple as a family for purposes of New 
York City's rent control program.33 
But this "functional equivalence" approach has its difficulties 
and drawbacks. Thus courts have hesitated to extend Marvin's 
principle to reach other ways of treating cohabitants like spouses. 
They have done so for reasons that are relevant to our inquiry. 
Marriage represents a specially serious and binding commitment 
two people make to each other. That commitment forms the basis 
for treating spouses in special ways. Of course, people don't have 
to marry in order to make such commitments, and some unmar-
ried couples may be as deeply and solidly bound as any husband 
and wife. But unless people go through the public affirmation of 
the commitment that marriage constitutes, the law cannot know 
that they have made it. The law could, of course, inquire into the 
quality of each non-marital commitment to see whether it met 
"marital standards." And indeed Marvin calls for just such 
inquiries.34 But they seem a distasteful invasion of privacy. Nor 
is it clear what standards and evidence would be used in evaluat-
ing the quality of a commitment. 
In addition, there is a slippery-slope problem, a problem 
created by the way common-law courts tend to use precedent. 
Marriage, I have been arguing, provides what lawyers call a 
bright-line rule. It is easy to tell when a couple is married, and the 
law treats them as married whatever the true nature of their 
30. 557 P2d 106 (Cal 1976). 
31. Id at 116, 122-23. 
32. 543 NE2d 49 (NY 1989). 
33. Id at 53-55. 
34. The Maruin court anticipated investigations into whether the parties' sexual 
relations were a severable part of their contract, into whether the parties had tried to 
avoid a marital relationship, and into any facts that might form the basis for any kind 
of equitable relief. 
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emotional relationship is. But once a court starts asking whether 
a non-marital relationship is the functional equivalent of marriage, 
it starts a process in which it compares the case at hand with the 
weakest case in which a couple has been found to have achieved 
the functional equivalent of marriage. The case at hand will some-
times seem just close enough to the weakest precedent to justify 
saying that it qualifies as the functional equivalent of marriage. 
That case then becomes a precedent, and the process begins again. 
The process is partly driven by the dynamics of our system of 
precedent. And it is accelerated by the fear that to refuse to call 
a relationship the equivalent of marriage is to deny its importance 
to the parties and is thus to demean the relationship. 
Why might this process be a problem? At the end of the day 
lies the risk that extending the regime of functional equivalents 
will tend to assimilate relatively transient and shallow relation-
ships to marriage. Yet the usefulness of marriage as a social 
institution depends in significant part on people's understanding 
that it is special, and that it is special in the seriousness of 
commitment that it demands. The risk, ih other words, is that 
extending the regime of functional equivalents will erode the 
special qualities of marriage and reduce marriage to just one more 
11life style choice.1135 
This brings us to our next reservation about functional-
equivalence approach. Marriage is not just an outward sign of 
inward commitment. It is a social and legal institution which 
reinforces that commitment. People who marry assume a role 
which carries social expectations with it, expectations most people 
have to some degree internalized and which are not avoided 
without cost. This increases the likelihood-although only the 
likelihood-that the quality of the relationship justifies according 
one member the power to make momentous decisions for the 
other.36 
I have been discussing some of the knotty problems of 
definition that would need to be untied before deference to family 
authority could be fully useful in solving bioethical problems. But 
35. For more complete comments on the "functional-equivalence" approach, see 
Schneider, 20 Hofstra L Rev (cited in note 19). 
36. For an extended exposition of the role and value of social institutions in the 
familial realm, see id. 
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there is a final problem with deferring to the family, however it is 
de:fined.37 Many of the bioethical decisions we might ask families 
to make are enormously consequential. They are literally questions 
of life and death. Yet two factors (at least) can make it hard for 
people in intimate relationships to decide them wisely. First, love 
is not the only strong feeling to which intimacy gives rise. Love 
can be mixed with equally potenfbut harsher feelings of jealousy, 
resentment, and even hate. Second, people in such relationships 
may have conflicts of interest that inhibit dispassion and diminish 
wisdom. Those conflicts include even the crassest kind of wish that 
one's relative should die so that one can receive an inheritance.38 
Less drastically and more sympathetically, they include concerns 
that one relative's lingering illness is damaging the well-being of 
37. Of course, family law has not burdened itself by trying to adopt a single 
definition of the family. Rather, it has adopted different definitions for different 
purposes. 
38. This is, as I say, the crassest way in which a family member's decisions might 
be distorted. But that does not mean that only the crassest people will be influenced by 
it. Archdeacon Grantly is not a bad man, but it is only after ''he thought long and sadly, 
in deep silence, and then gazed at that still living face" that he "at last dared to ask 
himself whether he really longed for his father's death" so that he might be appointed 
to his father's bishopric. Anthony Trollope, Barchester Towers 12 {Doubleday, nd). In 
addition to the fact of this distorting motive is the fear that it arouses. Prince Hal 
apparently is speaking the truth when he explains that he took the crown from his 
father's pillow because "I never thought to hear you speak again." But the king retorts, 
Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought: 
I stay too long by thee, I weary thee. 
Dost thou so hunger for mine empty chair 
That thou wilt needs invest thee with my honours 
Before they hour be ripe? 
And he has already expostulated: 
See, sons, what things you are! 
How quickly nature falls into revolt 
When gold becomes her object! 
For this the foolish over-careful fathers 
Have broke their sleep with thoughts, their brains with 
care, 
Their bones with industry; 
For this they have engrossed and piled up 
The canker'd heaps of strange-achieved gold; 
For this they have been thoughtful to invest 
Their sons with arts and martial exercises: 
When, like the bee, culling from every flower 
The virtuous sweets, 
Our thighs pack'd with wax, our mouths with honey, 
We bring it to the hive; and, like the bees, 
Are murder'd for our pains. 
William Shakespeare, The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth, act IV, sc. v. 
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other family members. Such concerns presumably contributed to 
the majority's reluctance in Cruzan simply to hand over treatment 
decisions to the family.39 And such concerns have helped motivate 
family law's long-standing reluctance to cede families complete 
control over decisions for their members. It is worth remembering, 
for example, that the law of child abuse requires parents to 
provide needed medical care for their children, and that the 
criminal law is in principle prepared to punish as homicide any 
failure to do so that results in a child's death.40 
Obviously, I am not arguing that families should not partici-
pate in making bioethical decisions for their members. My 
inclinations are quite to the contrary. But I think that the lesson 
of family law's experience is once again cautionary. Familial 
decisions can be acutely troublesome and troubling. Writing rules 
to govern such decisions is not without its complexities and even 
its dangers. Further, the atomizing tendencies of the age and its 
law-the ever-sharpening urge to treat family members as 
independent of each other-conflict harshly with the desire to 
confide crucial bioethical decisions to families. In short, what we 
have been calling 11family authority., offers only partial and 
problematic solutions to the kinds of bioethical issues we are 
discussing. 
VI. RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
Yet another common and conventional answer to the 
standards problem is to analyze issues in terms of rights.41 
Rights solutions confer on rights holders the power to resolve 
ethical questions and thereby relieve the state of the burden of 
doing so. Since rights thinking is one of the dominant modes of 
39. See Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4922. The Court also noted that "there is no automatic 
assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the 
patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation 
while competent." Id. 
40. For a challenging and illuminating illustration of the difficulty of family decisions 
in even the most benign circumstances, see John Hardwig, The Problem of Proxies With 
Interests of Their Own: Toward a Better Theory of Proxy Decisions, 1992 Utah L Rev 803. 
41. When I say "rights discourse," I will be referring primarily to the discourse about 
constitutional rights in the United States today. For an analysis of that discourse and 
its use in family law, see Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 
76 Cal L Rev 151 (1988). For an extended critical treatment of American rights 
discourse, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk (Free Press, 1991). 
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discourse in America today, it should be no surprise that there are 
few areas of family law which someone has not suggested should 
be constitutionalized, and that there are not a few-entry into 
marriage, reproductive freedom, parental rights, and some aspects 
of child custody, for instance-which have been. 
Rights solutions have seemed attractive in both areas of 
bioethics. Roe v. Wade obviously has something-often a great 
deal-to say about bioethical issues related to reproduction. And 
many of the questions about how medical-care decisions should be 
made have been analyzed in terms of rights, as the opinions in the 
Cruzan case suggest. Too many people (including me) have written 
too often and too long about Roe v. Wade to justify another inquiry 
into what it teaches about the usefulness of rights discourse. But 
we may learn something about three systematic problems with 
that discourse by looking more generally at family law's experience 
with it. 
The first of these systematic problems is that 11the origin, 
scope, justification, and purpose11 of many of the constitutional 
rights at issue in family law cases are uncertain.42 The rights at 
stake are generally what are loosely called 11privacy11 rights. These 
rights are essentially of recent origin, and the textual basis for 
them is slight. The case law through which they have been 
developed has not always labored to explore their nature or 
rationale. This is troubling on the familiar principle that in a 
democratic society courts, as non-majoritarian institutions, should 
not thwart decisions of majoritarian institutions without well-
founded, well-articulated authority.43 But it is also troubling at 
a more practical level. To see why, we need to understand 
something about how the Supreme Court analyzes family-law 
rights. The Court has commonly denominated most of these rights 
11fundamental, 11 and it has (albeit somewhat erratically) imposed on 
any statute with which these rights conflict a generally unbearable 
burden of justification. Thus the question whether a litigant can 
42. Schneider, 76 Cal L Rev at 158 (cited in note 41). 
43. One of the unfortunate problems with rights discourse is that its underlying 
principles are-reasonably enough, under the circumstances-poorly understood by even 
quite sophisticated publics. It now seems to be true that a dismaying number of people 
simply expect the Supreme Court to put into law desirable social policy, not to interpret 
the Constitution. For a particularly sympathetic but still dismaying example of this 
confusion, see Pete Busalacchi, How Can They?, Hastings Center Rep 6 (Sept/Oct 1990). 
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assert a right is crucial. Yet because of its uncertainty about the 
nature of these rights, the Court has regularly had difficulty 
answering that question coherently and predictably. 
The second systematic problem with family-law rights 
analysis lies in its difference from most other rights discourse. 
Ordinarily, we talk in terms of what I have called the Mill 
paradigm: 11That is, we think in terms of the state's regulation of 
a person's actions. In such conflicts, we are predisposed to favor 
the person, out of respect for his moral autonomy and human 
dignity.1144 That predisposition also rests on our assumption that 
the state can bear any risks of an incorrect decision better than 
the individual can. 11In family law, however, the Mill paradigm 
often breaks down, because in family law conflicts are often not 
between a person and the state but between one person and 
another person.1145 For example, we say that parents have a right 
to make decisions for their children. Yet we also say children have 
a right to life. If parents decide to deny their children treatment 
necessary to save their lives, how are we to choose between the 
two rights? 
The third systematic problem with rights discourse in family 
law has been its inability to deal convincingly with the interests 
the state asserts to justify its infringement of rights. The Court 
often says that where a 11fundamental11 right is at stake, a statute 
must be 11necessary11 to serve a 11compelling11 state interest. But in 
practice the Court has been unwilling to apply this standard 
consistently or to define the standard's terms comprehensibly. In 
large part, this is probably because the test essentially requires 
the Court to compare two incommensurable values-the impor-
tance of the right with the importance of the state interest. On 
what scale, to take the example of Zablocki v. Redhail, 46 do you 
weigh the right of a person to marry against the state's interest in 
assuring that parents will support their childrenr7 
44. Schneider, 76 Cal L Rev at 157 (cited in note 41). 
45. ld. 
46. 434 US 374 (1978). In Zablocki, the state had forbidden people to marry who 
already had children they could not or would not support. ld at 375. 
47. For detailed criticisms of the Court's state-interest analysis in family-law cases, 
see Schneider, L & Comtemp Probs, at 79 (cited in note 24); and Carl E. Schneider, 
State-Interest Analysis and the Channelling Function in Privacy Law, in Stephen 
Gottlieb, ed, Public Values in Constitutional Law (Mich U Press, forthcoming 1993). 
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. 
These three problems with rights ~scourse will often infect 
attempts to analyze bioethical issues in rights terms, if only 
because of the considerable overlap between family law and 
bioethics. Let us briefly examine some of the ways in which this 
happens by looking at the recent and familiar case of Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health. 48 The first of the prob-
lems of rights thinking we discussed was the obscurity of the 
origins, scope, justification, and purpose of family-law rights. I 
would suggest that such uncertainties about the nature of the 
right at stake in Cruzan explain much of the disagreement 
between the majority opinion and Justice Brennan's dissent. 
Justice Brennan vehemently insisted that Nancy Cruzan had ·a 
right to decide whether to receive food and water. But as· the 
majority noted, 11The difficulty with [that] claim is that in a sense 
it begs the question: an incompetent person is not able to make an 
informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to 
refuse treatment or any other right.1149 
The importance of Cruzan's incompetence lies in the nature 
of the right asserted for her. It is a right to decide. If we ask why 
we might attribute such a right to people, we are likely to suggest 
two reasons. The first is that people will make better decisions for 
themselves than the state can, since they know their own situation 
better than the state and have every incentive to make a more· 
careful decision than the state would. But this rationale did not 
apply in Cruzan, since Nancy Cruzan could not know anything or 
respond to any incentives. The second reason we might attribute 
such rights to people is 11out of respect for their status as indepen-
dent moral agents.1150 But once again there is a problem with this 
basis for the privacy right in Cruzan, since 11it makes little sense 
to attribute rights to people who cannot be independent moral 
agents.1151 The dissents needed, then, to explain why the origin 
48. For a statement of the facts of Cruzan, see note 8. For an extended treatment 
of the case as a social, moral, and political question, see Carl E. Schneider, Cruzan and 
the Constitutionalization of American Life, 17 J Med & Phil (forthcoming 1992). For good 
analyses of Cruzan as a constitutional problem, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the 
Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 Ga L Rev 
1139 (1991); and Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When is 
There No Constitutional "Right to Liue"?, 25 Ga L Rev 1203· (1991) .. 
49. Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4920. 
50. Schneider, 76 Cal L Rev at 165 (cited in note 41). 
51. Id. 
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and purpose of the right made it applicable to Cruzan. Instead, 
they formalistically and dogmatically insisted that she had a right 
to decide whatever her ability to claim, comprehend, or exercise it. 
Cruzan instantiates the breakdown of the Mill paradigm in 
several related ways. First, that paradigm assumes a competent 
right-holder, which Nancy Cruzan was not. This might not have 
been crucial had she had only one right and had it been incontro-
vertible that she would have wanted to exercise it. But the second 
way in which Cruzan departs from the Mill paradigm is that she 
had not just one right, but almost a cacophony of rights, rights 
which potentially conflicted. She had a right to life; she had a 
right to refuse treatment necessary to preserve her life; she had a 
right (Justice Stevens believed) to have a decision made in her 
best interests. Finally, there were in her case two sets of potential 
right-holders-Nancy Cruzan and her parents. Yet the interests 
of the two sets potentially conflicted in the ways I earlier de-
scribed.52 
Finally, underlying much of the debate in Cruzan was the 
question how the state's interests should be analyzed. The dissents 
essentially argued that the state has no interest in the life of a 
person who does not want to live and that therefore the state 
cannot require that it be shown by clear and convincing evidence 
(instead of a mere preponderance of the evidence) that an 
incompetent person wishes to refuse treatment. This, I think, 
unduly (and characteristically) depreciates the state's interests. 
For one thing, the state has an interest arising out of its protective 
function. The evidentiary standard challenged in Cruzan was to be 
applied in all cases in which the issue was whether life-sustaining 
treatment should be denied an incompetent patient. It may well 
be that Nancy Cruzan would have wanted not to be treated in her 
circumstances. But I think it is at least constitutionally reasonable 
for the state to assume that, while many and perhaps most people 
would choose at some point to refuse medical treatment, most 
people prefer life to death and will struggle to retain it as long as 
52. One way of resolving the potential conflict would be to say that Cruzan's parents 
had no distinct rights of their own, but were merely exercising her rights for her. 
However, this does not really make the problem go away, since there remain not only the 
questions whether her parents in fact had no right of their own and whether a right like 
Cruzan's could be exercised by an unappointed proxy but also the fact that her interests 
and their interests potentially conflicted. 
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they feel they can. On this view, the state protects people who 
cannot protect themselves by setting a general evidentiary 
standard that errs on the side of treatment. 53 This view is made 
more plausible by the consideration that the people-the fami-
ly-who will usually be seeking to end treatment will be people 
who will not uncommonly stand to benefit in some way from doing 
so. And even when, as will ordinarily be the case, patients 
ultimately do not need to be protected from their families, the 
state can point out that they may still need to be protected from 
the other people who may participate in making decisions about 
the patient--namely, the relevant medical personnel.54 
53. It is, as the dissents pointed out, no doubt true that Missouri's evidentiary 
standard would sometimes result in treatment being given where the patient would not 
have wanted it. See, for example, Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4926 (Brennan dissenting). But 
as the majority noted, such a result is quite unremarkable in our legal system. Id at 
4921. We regularly decline to give effect even to a clearly expressed intention where that 
intention has not been given the proper legal form, as the laws of wills, gifts, conveyanc-
ing, and contracts (to name only a few) all testify. We do so in part for reasons of 
efficiency: Where people have followed the correct legal forms in expressing their wishes, 
we are relieved of the burden of ad hoc inquiries into their true intent. But we also do 
so because we have the deepest doubts about the success of any such inquiries. In 
addition, we impose on people the obligation of making their preferences clear so that 
everyone who needs to know can know with confidence what those preferences are. 
Finally, we ordinarily decline to enforce preferences that are not expressed in the correct 
legal form because of our fear that even a clearly and accurately expressed wish may not 
be what the person truly wants. We have all had the experience of thinking that if some 
situation arose we would want some particular result, but nevertheless discovering that, 
when pressed to make an actual decision, our impulse was not our true wish. For a 
moving expression of such a discovery, see Vicki Williams, The Horror Is Worth It, 
Newsweek 14 (Oct 9, 1989), a wife's account of how her termin~lly ill husband reversed 
his initial decision to refuse aggressive treatment. Less dramatically, see Jay J.J. 
Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients' Values: 
Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4 Med Decision Making 47 (1984), which reports 
that a significant proportion of women who had chosen to forego analgesics during 
childbirth changed their minds during delivery. (It should be said that not all studies of 
patient preferences indicate this kind ofinstability. See, for instance, Maria A. Everhart 
and Robert A. Pearlman, Stability of Patient Preferences Regarding Life-Sustaining 
Treatments, 97 Chest 159 (1990).) The forms and formalities associated with preparing 
and signing legal documents are intended to bring home to their signers that a binding 
and consequential decision is being made and thus to promote as "true" a decision as 
possible. 
Part of the problem in Cruzan is probably that Nancy Cruzan was caught in a 
transitional period when new legal responses to the problems of incompetent patients are 
being created and publicized. It is possible that, as living wills and durable powers of 
attorney become more common, people like Cruzan will come to know about them and, 
where they want to, sign them. At least at that point it will be more reasonable to expect 
people to do so and to deny effect to any wishes they express that are not in a form 
clearly announcing that their wishes are intended to have legal effect. 
54. On the propensity of some physicians to see treatment issues as exclusively 
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In addition, is it true that society has no interest in the lives 
of its citizens once they have decided not to live? Suppose, for 
instance, that A had irrevocably decided to commit suicide and 
had taken poison which would inevitably result in his death. 
Suppose further that B then killed A. Is B innocent of homicide 
because Ns life has ceased to be of interest to society? Surely not. 
B is guilty of homicide partly because of the s~ial interest in 
maintaining a sense of the sanctity of human life in order to 
encourage people to respect it. But the social interest in Ns life 
also arises out of the belief that few things are more basically 
important than human life, that it is valuable in itself and not just 
to the holder, that "each man's death diminishes me." If there is 
a social interest in rocks, louseworts, and snail darters, why not 
in people's lives~ 
In criticizing contemporary rights discourse and in surveying 
its limitations, I have not intended to say that rights solutions 
should never be sought, that that discourse does not serve 
valuable purposes, or that all the problems with our rights 
discourse are insuperable. But in America today rights solutions 
have so powerful an appeal that the greater danger is that they 
will be unreflectively adopted and dogmatically defended. Thus I 
have been more concerned here with some of the cautionary 
experiences family law has encountered in using rights discourse 
than with the well-known advantages that flow from it. 
VII. THE FACILITATIVE FuNCTION 
Another response to the standards problem has recently 
grown ~bundantly in popularity. This response is to expand what 
I call the law's "facilitative function." The facilitative function 
medical and not at all moral or social, see Allen E. Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or 
Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-Type Cases, 5 Am 
J L & Med 97 (1979). For a more realistic look than any of the opinions in Cruzan offers 
of the actual practice of "informed consent," see B.W. Levin, The Culture and Politics of 
"Baby Doe" Decisions, Paper presented at the 108th Annual Spring Meeting of the 
American Ethnological Society (1986); and Zussman, Intensive Care (cited in note 13). 
55. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion took an even stronger line on the state-
interest question. It argued that what was at stake in the case was whether Cruzan 
could commit suicide and that the state's interest in preventing suicide was solidly 
established by centuries of statutory and case-law precedent. Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4924-
26 (Scalia concurring). 
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allows people to deploy the law's power to arrange their lives in 
ways they prefer. It has two primary forms. First, it offers people 
a legally enforceable way of specifying how their affairs should be 
handled, as when it allows them to specify in a will how their 
assets will be distributed. Second, it provides people with a legally 
enforceable way of arranging their relationships, as when it allows 
them to enter into contracts. An attraction of both forms is that 
they permit people to choose their own standards, so that the law 
need not prescribe standards for them. 56 
Family law has long resisted the use of contracts in most 
family settings. Recently, however, it has become markedly more 
willing to allow couples both before and during marriage to enter 
into contracts regulating some of their relations during and after 
marriage. And it has also become more welcoming of contracts 
between unmarried cohabitants. Nevertheless, family law's 
attitude toward contracts remains cautious. Why? For one thing, 
family relationships often involve emotive, fluid, and personal 
attitudes and behavior that are not consonant with the kinds of 
rationalistic and calculating attitudes that we associate with 
contract law. For another thing, people in family contexts may be 
unable or unwilling to bargain aggressively, to guard against 
internal and external emotional pressures, and to foresee far into 
the future how they will feel about complex and intractable 
problems they cannot now even imagine. Family law's protective 
function thus may well call for it to safeguard at least the weaker 
party to the contract. Further, many contracts affect people 
besides the contracting parties. These people will not have had the 
choice of standards the parties to the contract had, and so for 
them the facilitative function will not have solved the standards 
problem. What is worse, these third parties may be injured by the 
contract, thus calling the protective function into play. And, of 
course, there is always the awkward fact that many people will 
not make a contract despite every incentive to do so, just as many 
people will not write a will despite centuries of encouragement and 
admonishment. In sum, family law has resisted contract as an 
56. For an exploration of the facilitative function and of contract in family law, see 
Schneider, Family Law: Cases and Materials (cited in note 7). For a more extended and 
favorable view of the use of contract in family law than I offer in this essay, see Maijorie 
M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CalL Rev 
204, 244-65 (1982). 
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ordering principle because of doubts about the appropriateness of 
using a commercial mechanism in a personal setting, and families 
seem often to share that resistance. 
Similar concerns will inhibit solving bioethical problems 
through the facilitative function. Consider, for instance, surrogate-
mother contracts. Can prospective surrogates think with the 
rationality contracts require about something as fiercely "emotive, 
fluid, and personal" as how they will feel about giving up the child 
they have borne for someone else? Will they be economically or 
psychologically vulnerable and be pressured into making agree-
ments they will ultimately regret and even abjure? Will they be 
willing and able to bargain aggressively to protect their interests? 
Will they foresee when they sign the contract how they will feel 
when the time comes to execute it? And, of course, the contract 
produces a person who was not party to it-the child. The law will 
have some interest in protecting that child, and in doing so the 
law will again be returned to the standards problem.57 
The other aspect of the facilitative function-the one which 
allows people to recruit the law's power to effectuate their 
individual intentions-has also emerged as a solution to some 
bioethical problems. Primary examples are the living will and the 
durable power of attorney. But these devices are also subject to 
some of the uncertainties that characterize the facilitative 
function. How far will people signing such a document fully 
understand the circumstances in which it might be applied, fully 
have thought about their own feelings about these distressing 
subjects in the present, and accurately anticipate how they will 
feel in the future? Will they have been unduly influenced by the 
people around them? These questions are intended to suggest, of 
course, that medical decisions are brutally hard to make under the 
best of circumstances and that making them in a present that 
might be unrecognizably different from the future is to make them 
under quite deplorable circumstances. It is thus not surprising 
57. For a fuller treatment of this problem, see Carl E. Schneider, Surrogate 
Motherhood from the Perspective of Family Law, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 125 (1990); 
Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues (Harv U Press, 
1990); Symposium, In re Baby M, 76 Georgetown L J 1719 (1988). For discussions of the 
related question of a market for adoptive children, see Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard 
A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J Legal Stud 323 (1978); Symposium, 
Adoption and Market Theory, 67 BU L Rev 59 (1987). 
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that there is evidence that advance directives have a good deal 
less effect than we might like to believe. 58 
All these considerations suggest that we should constrain our 
ever-soaring hopes that the devices of the facilitative function will 
solve the bioethical dilemmas we now face. They also counsel us 
that, if the facilitative function is to be given substantial legal 
standing in bioethical decisions, it should at least be in a carefully 
formalized way. Casual substitutes for careful thought should not 
be encouraged, for the facilitative function achieves its deepest 
justification only when it backs with the force of law people's 
genuinely considered wishes. The questions I asked above are hard 
enough where the prospect of signing a binding legal document 
has brought home the fact that serious issues are being re-
solved.59 These questions become next to inipossible when, as in 
Cruzan, the only evidence is the possibly quite casual remarks to 
friends of a young person who is not aware that what she says will 
have actual consequences and who does not expect to have 
desperate medical problems for decades. And when the patient 
was never in his life competent to formulate an opinion on 
treatment, any attempt to decipher his intention must be wholly 
fictional. 50 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This attempt to glean lessons for bioethics from family law 
has yielded no determinate answers or easy principles. I have 
suggested that family law has recently struggled to avoid the 
58. See, for example, David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in Eru:l-of-Life 
Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 -(1992). Lawyers are regularly surprised when the world 
ignores legal rules, but by now they should not be. See, for example, Stewart Macaulay's 
classic study of the use of contracts in business: Non-Contractual Relations in Business: 
A Preliminary Study, 28 Am Soc Rev 55 (1963). On the distance between law and life in 
one significant area of family law, see Schneider, 1991 BYU L Rev at 203-209 (cited in 
note 2). 
59. For a masterly demonstration of just how baffiing those questions can be even 
in optimal conditions, see Patricia D. White, Appointing a Proxy Under the Best of 
Circumstances, 1992 Utah L Rev 849. 
60. See, for example, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 
NE2d 417 (Mass 1977), where the court struggled hopelessly to solve the problem by 
attempting to do what the patient would have done had he been competent to decide for 
himself. Id at 431. For a good statement of the limits of this "substituted judgment" 
procedure, see Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of 
Surrogate Decision Making 112-22 (Cambridge U Press, 1989). 
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standards problems. Yet I have argued that each method of doing 
so is itself importantly flawed and sharply limited. I must confess 
that, if anything, this survey has been too pessimistic, that it has 
looked more assiduously for the drawbacks than the benefits of 
each approach. I should also say that my survey has confined itself 
to examining broad approaches, rather than seeking the surely 
valuable lessons to be learned from family law's concrete, common-
law resolutions of particular fact-patterns. 
On the other hand, if my cautionary approach is essentially 
correct, two conclusions might follow. The first is that the 
standards problem might be confronted directly. My own inclina-
tion is that there is something in this. I am not persuaded, despite 
some real evidence to the contrary, that the processes of democrat-
ic government are wholly incapable of resolving the kinds of value 
conflicts that family law and bioethics present or that allowing 
them to do so is wholly incompatible with a free society. But I 
readily admit that this is only an inclination, and that I have not 
fully worked out all my own views on the subject.61 
The other conclusion that might be drawn from family law's 
quandary is that we must content ourselves with imperfect 
solutions to the perplexing issues family law and bioethics present 
us. Perhaps one reason the approaches I have canvassed seem so 
inadequate is that too much has been expected of the law. We 
want the law always to reach the right result, and when in a 
given case it fails to do so, we demand in our distress that 
somehow the law should be changed. We insist that the law must 
get every case right, and we are indignant when it fails (by our 
lights) to do so. But family law and bioethics, like much oflaw, are 
areas where it is hard to know what the right result is, where 
often there will be no right result, and where there is no way of 
assuring that the right result will consistently be reached. Both 
areas, like much of law and life, involve what have been called 
11tragic choices11-irreducible conflicts between legitimate inter-
ests.62 We may, then, have to content ourselves with picking 
61. For an attempt to work out some of those views in the particular context of the 
law of alimony, see Schneider, 1991 BYU L Rev (cited in note 2). 
62. For a general description of this problem, see Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, 
Tragic Choices (WW Norton & Co, 1978). For a further treatment of it, one that has 
much to say in particular about its appearance in the dispute over abortion, see Guido 
Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public 
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eclectically whichever approach seems best adapted to the 
particular problem at hand, consoling ourselves with the realiza-
tion that often human institutions can do no better than to muddle 
through. 
Law Problem (Syracuse U Press, 1985). 
